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The nature of consciousness and the Explanatory Gap





What is consciousness? Can consciousness be fully justified as a physical entity? To what extent does the human mind resemble the computer? How do physical systems or the physical brain processes give rise to conscious experience? All these questions expose us to the unique mystery of consciousness, in what Chalmers calls one of the biggest mysteries in the world.
Consciousness has been debated since the birth of philosophy in ancient Greece, throughout the modern age and more recently becoming the subject of study in the present Philosophy of Mind. Descartes proposes a definition of consciousness as a “single, simple, continuing and accessible mental substance”, while Locke suggests that consciousness and the unity of self are provided by memory. On the other hand, Hume is unable to discover the self by introspection: “I never catch myself at any time without a perception” denying the existence of a separate self. 
Nowadays, philosophers argue that gaining complete knowledge of brain functions and cerebral processes will still leave open questions regarding the nature of consciousness. On the contrary, neuroscience would assume the possibility of a complete explanation of the mind in neurophysiological and psychosomatic terms.4
The famous body-mind problem became, over the past two millennia, the source of extensive con​troversies and meaningful philosophical debates. The core of the problem, as Benneth Sayre was saying, is the fact that, although we are able to conceive ourselves as having both body and mind features, we can’t explain how the two are related. 
Does everything that is mental have a physical explanation? Throughout history, philosophy and psychology have used the term “consciousness” with different meanings, in different contexts: as general knowledge, intentionality, introspection or self-consciousness, apperception, attention, sentience, self-awareness or phenomenal experience. The list doesn’t end here. 
We could say that, at this point in scientific development, the term cannot be strictly and rigorously defined. Of course, the main ambiguity comes from the absence of an explanation and a scientifically correct description of the concept. We use it in a strict philosophical sense of phenomenal consciousness, as a subjective experience, responsive to the environment as well as self-awareness of one’s own conscious states.3 
Can a machine achieve a conscious state? This question is probably more philosophical than it appears and it is a consequence of our attempts to define human consciousness. As we know, phenomenal experience has often been identified and described in nonphysical terms. Some also argued about the “nonphysicality” of consciousness, in a more or less naturalist and physicalist manner. The “mystery of consciousness” emerges straight from a lack of explanation that would introduce either an epistemological gap or even an ontological one. 
Is this explanatory gap real, a cognitive illusion or is it based on our own weaknesses? Could it be potentially closed, once we progress in our knowledge? If the phenomenal experience could be described in fully physical terms (in the strict traditional sense), we still need an explanation even though we don’t have it yet.2
Is consciousness a physical entity? Perhaps it is, we say, but taking the word “physical” in a larger and non-traditional sense that is currently used in modern science. Every modern approach in regard to this issue would become a response, positive or negative, to the cartesian distinction between body and mind. Today, more than three hundred years after Descartes’ philosophy, philosophers and philosophies argue over the powerful and provocative dualist argument and what we call Descartes’ “central error”. 
The explanatory gap, considered as a standalone hypothesis, shared by a number of philosophers with various views and opinions - Nagel, Levine, Jackson, Chalmers – looks at the mind as being an unexplained, unsolvable and mysterious subject, from both physical or metaphysical points of view. Following this path, this theory suggests, more or less, the impossibility of formulating a complete description of the fundamental nature of consciousness.10 
But what is the explanatory gap after all? It acts as a feedback to our incomplete understanding of how consciousness works or how it can be justified. It also represents a response to the question of whether our mind depends upon a physical substrate. In its weak variation, the argument only acknowledges our cognitive and practical limits in the current state of scientific progress. 
We will show why such an angle is most likely to be valid, compared to stronger forms of the postulate. We don’t question the fundamental capacity of reasoning. We only intend to stress the significance and importance of the explanatory argument within the fundamental theory of consciousness. Are we really "cognitively closed", as McGinn was suggesting? 
The proposal of the existence of an “explanatory gap” between the physical world and the realm of phenomenal consciousness became evidently one of the most challenging arguments against materialist cognitive models. 
There could be considered three main assumptions concerning the legitimacy of the gap argument. 
In some opinions, we are entitled to completely deny such a hypothesis, by claiming that mental phenomena could be justified in physical terms or even easier, that the gap is a false impression and the properties of our sensorial experience, which were called “qualia”, simply do not exist (Dennet, Churchland, Michael Tye). 
According to Patricia and Paul Churchland, from a physicalist point of view, there is nothing in nature beyond physical states and processes. They are suggesting a strong radical physicalist viewpoint, called “eliminative materialism” that would eliminate “folk psychology” and its constitutive theoretical entities, such as “beliefs,” “fears,” “desires,” “perceptions,” all called “propositional attitudes”. Our common-sense concept of mental states becomes, in their view, a false, fundamentally defective theory that needs to be completely reduced to neuroscience.5
From a different perspective, functionalism (D. M. Armstrong, H. Putnam), explains consciousness through causal relations between different mental states and by sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. In his essay “Nature of Mental States”, Putnam claims that mental states could be produced in different physical systems with the appropriate functional structure. The states of consciousness are no longer dependent and emerged from their inherent and constitutional properties. This thesis has established the basis of cognitive functionalism, as an alternate theory of mind that would explain consciousness through its functions, causes and effects, rather than through its internal constitution.
From an eliminativist perspective, there is no explanatory gap because consciousness does not exist. The “explanatory gap” argument is eliminated by ruling out the concept of consciousness. According to Dennett or Julian Jaynes, consciousness is a cultural construction, invented by ancient Greeks, around 1400 B.C.
There are also advocates of the argument, suggesting that there is at present a temporary explanatory gap because our consciousness phenomena don’t yet have a scientific explanation. On the other hand, in their opinion, our knowledge and experience would extend to that point where we can conceive and offer a further physical explanation of our mental experiences (dualists like Nagel or Searle).11 They believe that it may be possible to close the gap only through an extension of our current knowledge about mental phenomena.15
In a recent book, “The Rediscovery of the Mind”, Searle criticizes the central concepts in the present study of mind by attempting to inaugurate the “perfect science of the brain''.12 His main objective is to overcome the dominant traditions in cognitive science, both "materialist" and "dualist." Searle is neither a "dualist" (the belief that soul and body are two different substances) nor a "materialist" (the soul is material). Searle resurrects Nagel's argument that consciousness cannot be explained, making two fundamental assertions:
	consciousness must be central to the cognitive sciences. 
	consciousness is a feature of the brain as much as liquidity is a feature of water.13
He proposes a serious final re-examination of consciousness, the central mental phenomenon, in the hope of rediscovering the mind. He concludes that consciousness is a physical property of the brain and it is irreducible to any other physical property.
In a third case, there are points of view that insist that the gap exists and also, that there is no physical justification of the mind, due to its completely different nature. 
From a dualist-interactionist position (Chalmers, Popper), using the famous zombie argument (Zombies are physically identical to us but lack our phenomenal experience), Chalmers presents a series of arguments against the view that there is a necessary a priori continuance from physical states to mental states. From his point of view, conscious experience cannot be reductively explained in physical terms. A proponent of the “hard problem of consciousness”, Chalmers puts forward the central problem of consciousness, identified by the essential task of explaining conscious states as related to phenomenal experience. 
Chalmers draws a distinction between the "easy problems" of consciousness (cognitive functions like discrimination and the focus of attention) and the "hard problem" (“why and how should any of these psychological properties be accompanied by phenomenal experience’, “how and why cognitive functioning is accompanied by conscious experience”, “how physical systems or physical processes give rise to conscious experience”, “what is the relation between the physical, the psychological and the phenomenal”). There could be infinite formulations of the “hard problem”:
	Why do physical processes give rise to our internal rich experience?
	Why do qualia exist?
	Why is there a subjective component to experience? etc.
Chalmers concludes that consciousness, and subsequently conscious experience represent the most enigmatic and complex problem in the study of mind.
Many philosophers agree that some of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of mind started with Thomas Nagel's reformulation of the mind-body problem (1974). Nagel questioned if the brain states would justify our conscious internal experiences, claiming the presence of an "explanatory gap" that sits between physical processes and consciousness. His classic paper "What is it like to be a bat?" had great influence upon the study of consciousness in the last century. 
The phrase itself “there is something it is like” caused enthusiasm and excitement among philosophers and triggered a diversity of ideas and arguments in the community. The main idea was to launch a counter-attack against cognitive physicalism and naturalist ideas, which reduce mental states to physical events.6 
According to Nagel, although consciousness is a natural phenomenon, the subjective realm represents a special case, the essential characteristic of phenomenal experiences being the simple fact that they are subjective. Any reductionist objective, neutral, third-person approach dealing with mental phenomena would, therefore make no sense. 
A plain objective study of consciousness would leave out its own essential nature. As we know, subjectivity was regularly identified with the phenomenal states of mind or with the qualitative characteristics of our experience, often called “qualia” (from the Latin, meaning "what sort" or "what kind").7 
There are also extreme positions that insist on a fundamental, “in se” discontinuity between physical and phenomenal layers. In this case, the gap can’t be closed due to imposed constitutive cognitive limits (McGinn, 1991). The opened gap becomes part of the fundamental nature of consciousness as a fraction of the more extensive physical substratum. 
If there is no reduction of the mental to the physical layer or, mutatis mutandis, the physical nature doesn’t conceal or integrate in some unexplained form the mental phenomena, the direct exigency required would be any variant of dualism. It is obvious that dualists would necessarily assume a kind of metaphysical gap between mind and body. In fact, a metaphysical dualist thesis introduces this type of argument to defend its own purpose and to justify the legitimacy of a potential separation between the two. 
Evidently, the gap exists, we affirm, the only arguable thesis remaining the possibility of closing it or not. If consciousness is not a fully analysable concept, this is just a consequence of our current limitations and it shouldn’t affect the potential understanding and justification of the mind itself. 
The “explanatory gap” term was introduced by Joseph Levine, in his paper “Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap”, basically on epistemological grounds. The “hard variant” of the term consists of accepting a deeper, natural, necessary interval between mental and non-mental objects. Levine concludes that the argument doesn't expose a real gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature, in other words, the gap doesn’t have a metaphysical nature.8 Obviously, a good reason for this would be to suppose a genuine gap in nature, currently hidden by our cognitive limits. In his opinion, if we accept the metaphysical hypothesis, we still need to look for a root cause of the ontological gap. 
Of course, the “extra” element that closes the gap can equally have an epistemological nature or could be justified by employing metaphysical reasons. Levine proposes a deep analysis of two elements, considered as physical objects: water and consciousness, as well as a detailed investigation of the epistemic and ontological differences between the two. He considers the gap as being potentially uncloseable.
Consciousness is the central element in most of the arguments, theories and debates around the body-mind subject. There is also a quite common opinion among philosophers that a complete understanding of the nature of consciousness depends on the analysis of its place in nature. In other words, a justification of the consciousness can’t be done without taking into account its interaction with the external world. But do we know enough about nature’s laws to be able to make assumptions about the fundamental nature of consciousness? Can we justify the non-conscious so that we could subsequently afford an explanation of the conscious? 
If we assume an essential connection between the two types of objects, the gap vanishes and there would be no major or fundamental difference between any computational device and consciousness. The human mind itself could be explained, in a naturalistic way, by its neural circuits or psychosomatic processes.
Regardless of the adopted position, there are only two alternatives to cross the existing bridge: to accept any kind of reductionism from one layer to another and therefore “close” the gap or solve the problem by discouraging any potential approaches to do so.  
Consequently, we can consider two divergent versions of the problem: the “strong” sense would not allow any continuity between the layers. In this case, any naturalism and justification on physicalist grounds would be excluded.
On the other hand, there are philosophers who embrace a more softened meaning of the gap argument
From the position of what was called “realistic monism”, Strawson, in his paper “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism”, affirms that all experiential phenomena have a physical nature. This affirmation is true as long as we reconsider our main concept of “nature” or “physical” and extend it to be able to include conscious phenomena as well.14
Once we understand the “new” generalized concept of nature, there is space to include and justify mental states as being intrinsically integrated into the physical world. In the case of the traditional physicalism, the main thesis is that ultimate reality is material and can be fully described by physics. We still have an explanatory gap as the task of reduction of the mental layer to the physical one.
As we can see, confronted by an existing (real or apparent?) explanatory gap between the physical world and phenomenal states, philosophers responded in many different ways to the “hard problem” of consciousness. Some would say that the explanatory gap is uncloseable and that the immediate conclusion is that there is a metaphysical gap that makes mental and physical to be totally irreducible to each other. Some insist on a reductionist, purely physicalist view of experience, as the solution that would “fill” the gap. Others hold that the explanatory gap may be closed, when our knowledge becomes more extensive and able to integrate subjective entities. 
The standard formulation of the “mind-body problem” relies on a simple assumption that matter and mind are completely independent as well as irreducible to each other. This becomes more than just an epistemological claim and develops into a metaphysical sine qua non prerogative. The fantasy of a “mysterious consciousness” would naturally spring from here. 
The mystery itself comes from a semantic and conceptual ambiguity and has a strictly epistemological character. The root cause of an apparent permanent gap is the fact that no one has ever given an account, albeit incomplete, of the nature of our phenomenal experience or could describe the established relationship between mental and non-mental processes. 
A provisional explanatory gap within the mind-body problem wouldn’t therefore have any further impact or significant consequences on any potential theoretical approaches to provide a descriptive model of the consciousness. Any lack of knowledge or missing scientific model, shouldn’t infer the presence an ontological hiatus as a total discontinuity or separation between physical and mental. The irreducibility of the subjective to objective or vice versa becomes, apparently, a complex solution to a simple problem. 
	Our failure relies on the assumption that the current physics program doesn’t simply cover, from a semantic, conceptual or descriptive point of view, mental processes or conscious states. 
The “explanatory gap” would be therefore a direct consequence of our temporary difficulty to connect and integrate both of the layers, physical and mental, in a single ontological program. The absence of a descriptive phenomenology of the mind seems to lead to an apparent “mysterious” ontological interval between the two substrates. 
Descartes’ error is therefore reduced to a concealed acceptance that existent physics offers a quite close picture of the world we experience in our measurements or even our ordinary experiences. This prerogative becomes weaker every day, as modern quantum physics, new space and time theories, new information theory bring us fresh evidence of a currently incomplete representation of the fundamental nature of reality. 
Any new modest metaphysical speculative idea or ontological postulate that would include an implicit justification of consciousness, should consider and incorporate the latest results in physical theoretical framework. The puzzle of consciousness can’t be resolved unless we generalize our traditional concepts and we positively accept the fact that physics doesn’t yet offer a complete description of the fundamental nature of matter, information, space and time. 
We criticize the presence of an ontological gap as well as any dualist tendencies, in a way that allows us to acknowledge a real epistemological explanatory gap based on a masked “resignation” of an incomplete, unresolved or unsatisfactory physical descriptive framework. 
Our ignorance in regards to the fundamental nature of matter leads to conceptual difficulties when searching for a resolution to the mind-body problem. How does a physical process give rise to conscious experiences? Here we encounter the same difficulties that generally arise in any reductionist approach, particularly naturalist theories of consciousness. Difficulties in reconciling theories like quantum mechanics, relativity theory and theory of strings and superstrings as root problems in providing a correct picture of reality lead to insurmountable difficulties and absurdities in understanding the phenomenal experience and the way we perceive this reality. Our proficiency to provide a complete and satisfactory theory of mind depends on a better understanding of the modern fundamental physics conceptual system.
If we accept that we are incapable of understanding how “technicolour phenomenology [can] arise from soggy grey matter”, as McGinn suggests, we believe this is only a provisional stage in our attempt to provide a full theory about consciousness, driven by a larger theoretical framework that would potentially include the ordinary experience as well the fundamental current physics program.9
We believe, following Strawson’s argumentation, that “there is no metaphysical mind-body problem, only an epistemological one”. Of course, in the meantime, we have succeeded to identify the “the explanatory gap” as the root problem (or the “hard” one) of the mind-body argument. The so called “substance monism” assumes a strong ontological postulate, beyond or as a prerequisite for any theory of consciousness.
Advocates of the “mysterian” view suggest that consciousness may never be fully explained, following Chomsky’s distinction between problems, potentially solvable and mysteries, totally unsolvable and impenetrable. The “new mysterianism” concludes that the human mind can’t and never will understand consciousness as well as the relationship between mind and matter. 
However, according to Ockham's Razor principle, “entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' or in other words, “keep it simple''. There is no reason to not consider reality as an homogeneous, monolithic system, more likely than a heterogeneous, multi-layered, irregular one, where mind and matter would always be separated. Any such assumption would subsequently lead to new postulates that should be able to explain how the two ingredients would survive in a consistent, coherent reality. Such postulates would need to fully preserve the consistency and coherence of the entire ontological program. 
The point of view that reality contains only one kind of entity and that mental and physical events are not separated by any sort of ontological discontinuity is an easier and simpler idea than considering reality as composed from distinct layers. 
The view that the mental and the physical ingredients are irreconcilably distinct and even antagonistic doesn’t seem so simple when comparing to the simple homogeneous solution. 
The main interrogation about the fundamental nature of consciousness becomes an explanatory problem with respect to the qualitative subjective, phenomenal experiences or phenomenal consciousness in general. The hard problem of cognitive science represents the direct consequence of our partial understanding of how physical processes could cause phenomenal states as part of our conscious experience. So far, neuroscience or any other cognitive theories of consciousness don’t appear to fully handle and to offer complete, viable solutions to the hard problem of consciousness. 
For example, Crick and Koch’s neurobiological approach to the problem of consciousness asserts that oscillations on a certain frequency in the cerebral cortex generate the entire neural basis of consciousness. If the basic hypothesis is correct from a neuroscientific point of view,  it doesn’t solve the “hard” problem, by justifying the presence of conscious experience as relating to its neuronal correlates. The theory doesn’t answer the main question why experience accompanies brain processes. 
What justifies the subjective states of consciousness? What makes them possible? Why does consciousness exist? The hard problem formulates these mysteries in a different way: how do physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective states of consciousness? Obviously, the problem is the same, as long as we all agree that there is a necessary causal relation between brain states and conscious experience.
Subjective experience is definitely the most familiar thing in the world because we experience it in the most direct and intimate way. All we know about consciousness, we know from our direct, ordinary subjective experiences. 
Perhaps, we say, this is the simple reason it is so hard to fit it in our existent cognitive basis and reconcile it with the rest of our knowledge, as this type of knowledge is always acquired from the external world, using different tools and methods. Can consciousness be described using the same methods as in physical science, for example? This is evidently still part of the “hard problem”. 
Of course, we do agree that a "first-person experience" is fundamentally different from a "third-person experience". No existing formal language can fully describe such a unique experience or causally predict any future actions based on the existing brain activity data. Apparently, a thorough first-person approach is necessary to justify conscious experience. In this case, an objective description of consciousness would be impossible, using analytical rigorous methods. Any attempt to justify human experience from a scientific point of view would be therefore unsuccessful.
The limitations of such an objective, naturalist explanation of experience was clarified by Nagel in his “What is it Like to be a Bat?”. According to Nagel’s argument, bat’s consciousness is just “what it is like to be a bat”.
Trying to emphasise the “uniqueness” of conscious experience, Chalmers, in a parallel with the physics case, was even suggesting that any theory of consciousness must "take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time."1 We agree with the fact that the conscious experience is a fundamental phenomenon. We also accept it is a natural one, as a component of the nature itself.
But how do we integrate into an objective, full description of the world, an experience that is fundamentally different by its nature? The hard problem of consciousness is hard because of this. 
From quite a skeptical but optimistic position, we believe that there is not enough data in the current description of the external world, provided by modern physics theories, to be able to assimilate human experience as part of a complete description of reality. 
The hard problem exists and even more, it is solvable because consciousness is essentially a component of nature. We cannot imagine such a component that would not be inexorably irreducible to a natural substrate. However, we could imagine a quite large gap in our understanding of nature, enough to define certain limitations in our potential attempts to explain experience and conscious states and consequently endanger any possibility of providing a complete theory of consciousness. 
The problem itself doesn’t reduce only to understand the relationship between consciousness and the physical world but also assuming a complete correct theory of nature. The explanatory gap would be the direct consequence of such a limitation. 
That “something extra” that would fill the explanatory gap is more than likely the answer itself to the problem of consciousness. The proposed task of understanding consciousness is an ongoing project that relies upon prior knowledge of the different aspects of mind or experience. 
The main problem of the explanatory gap, whether it reduces consciousness to physical properties or opens epistemic or metaphysical fractures, reveals and assimilates the question itself about the fundamental nature of consciousness. 
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